Delaware's Dominance: A Peculiar Illustration of American Federalism
Robert B. Thompson  Who makes corporate law has often been as important as its substance. The traditional presentation accepts state law as the predominant source of corporate rules and focuses on the "race between the states" dimension of the "who makes corporate law" question. For the last half century or more the accepted wisdom has been that Delaware has won this race for corporation charters and the money that comes with it, although states and commentators probe for chinks in the Delawarean armor. In many ways, this discussion is still framed by the key question of corporate law from the 1960s and 1970s: is Delaware's dominance explained by a "race to the bottom" skewing corporate law in favor of management interests who influence state lawmaking at the expense of shareholders or by a "race to the top" with state law incorporating rules that reflect preferences made through markets. 1 This race between the states, however, cannot be understood without examining two other dimensions-the extent to which we rely on markets or government for corporate rule-making and the federalism dimension of apportioning responsibility between federal and state governments.
For the first half of our country's history after independence, none of the three dimensions was of particular importance. Corporate law was almost entirely at the state level with some United States Supreme Court cases reinforcing the right of corporations  Peter P. Weidenbruch Jr. Professor of Business Law, Georgetown University Law
Center.
1 See infra notes xx-xx.
to own property, make contracts, and to sue and be sued that had been commonly extended to collective entities in English law and elsewhere. 2 Government regulation of entities (e.g. their permitted purposes, size, and duration) were common and followed from the sovereign's capacity to create corporations. Things changed in the last decade or so of the nineteenth century. State authorization of corporations to own stock in other corporations and the decline of state ability to regulate foreign corporations opened the way for states to openly compete for corporations headquartered in neighboring states.
The content of the state corporations statutes also dramatically changed. "Laissez faire"
statutes in New Jersey in 1896, soon followed elsewhere, signaled a shift to private ordering and markets at a time when the decline of ultra vires, quo waranto and regulation of foreign corporations first made it possible for a state to attract substantial incorporation business from its neighbors. Some current illustrations of the race between the states, for example, bylaws limiting where suits can be brought, reflect this dimension as well. The regulatory impulse of the earlier corporations statutes, however, did not disappear. It simply moved to federal law, setting up the federalism dimension of the "who makes corporate law" debate.
This chapter examines the contemporary interaction of corporate law along these three dimensions with a particular focus on federalism. In the same way that we often frame the race between the states in the examples of the 1960s and 1970s, the concepts of federalism that we bring to the discussion date from the New Deal and focus on whether the federal government will preempt state corporate law, usually by adding regulation to a space that state law has left to private ordering. 3 Corporate law federalism is different than the classic constitutional doctrine of our history and bears only faint resemblance to contemporary federalism discussions in areas such as education, energy and environmental law. An "on-off "view of allocating law-making power between state or federal government has given way in other fields to a more nuanced view of interactive federalism. This chapter presents the richer and more nuanced space of 21 st century corporate law federalism that has some points in common with federalism discussion in other subject areas and some that reflect the particular history of the development of corporate law. The last section suggests how this federalism dimension influences the race between the states dimension of who makes corporate law in a way that essentially has locked Delaware's dominance in place.
I. The Point of Inflection for "Who Makes Corporate Law"
Delaware rose to preeminence in the incorporation market after a key point of inflection for corporate law. Fort the first half of American history (to date) corporate law moved through waves of significant changes, all focused in state law: acceptance of limited liability for shareholders, the rise of general incorporation statutes, a strong shift to director-centric corporate governance, and authorization of corporations' owning stock in other corporations, among others. 4 Then around the turn of the 20 th century, Delaware quickly followed New Jersey in a move to a laissez-faire statute. In the time since that point state corporation law has been much more stable in the now familiar 3 For discussion of traditional concepts of dual federalism see Part II infra. 4 See infra, Part IA. There were very few business corporations at the time of the founding of the American republic. 5 The corporate form passed down from the king's government had been used mostly for religious or charitable purposes or quasi-public (bridge or turnpike)
entities. Fundamental economic and financial changes as the industrial revolution spread increased the scale of business and the size of the market in which entrepreneurs could compete effectively. By the 1830s, manufacturing corporations exceeded those in banking, insurance, and public service and the number was growing. 6 There was a greater need for enterprises which assembled the capital from more than one person. 7 There was a greater need for legal rule to reflect and facilitate these developments and to accommodate the political will evident in the Jacksonian era to democratize the availability of the corporate form.
Over the course of the nineteenth century, there were many dramatic shifts in corporate law:
• Limited liability for shareholders (and for officers and directors) became the legally provided norm (although liability for double the amount of money paid for shares was common even after limited liability was inserted into law);
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• General incorporation statutes as opposed to special chartering by the legislature spread through the middle decades of the nineteenth century (although here, too, the change was gradual, not a dramatic on-off switch, as many states continued special chartering alongside general incorporation until late in the century 9 and in Delaware, for example, the number of special charters greatly exceeded those provided under the general statute);
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• Corporate law moved strongly toward centralized management, reflected in a shift from the importance of the general meeting of shareholders to broad powers for directors 11 and a centralized structure that could accommodate the rising influence of middle management;
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• Late in the century, changes in corporate law permitted corporations to own stock in other corporations, permitting holding companies that facilitated companies doing business outside their state of incorporation when prior law had often prohibited such action. The Court in that same period followed a similar and traditional federalism analysis as to tender offer regulation, added to the federal securities law in 1968. Some disappointed bidders sought to use the stated purpose of the Act "to insure that public shareholders who are confronted by a cash tender offer for their stock will not be required to respond without adequate information" to attack defensives tactics by management.
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The Court declined to read the statute as going beyond disclosure to substantive fairness and lower courts declined to permit litigants to use this federal law or the commerce clause to challenge state laws that did not permit bidders a meaningful opportunity for success.
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The Court of Appeals of the D.C. Circuit has followed a similar traditional federalism approach in two opinions two decades apart that struck down rules promulgated by the SEC as intruding too much into state law. In a 1990 decision, the court considered an agency rule banning midstream adoption by a corporation of a dual As with the examples discussed above, the common federalism approach is to assume the activity is in one realm or the other and to plumb the statute or policy to see which place it belongs. Such an approach reflects the dual federalism approach of the 1930s. 49 While it could describe some issues of securities regulation, contemporary discussion is not an on-off switch but a more interactive analysis as developed in the following section.
2. Interactive Federalism in the Corporate Space.
More recent examples of federal-state interaction look somewhat different than those just described and show a more nuanced interaction between federal and state law.
Congress has explicitly chosen not to embrace an exclusive and non-overlapping sphere in most areas of the corporate space so that a separate analytical framework in necessary to analyze federalism question. Delaware's Court of Chancery sees many more cases involving large transactions by public companies than the federal courts of our circuit do, and so we should heed the recent retraction by a judge of that court of the court's "willingness in the past to approve disclosure settlements of marginal value and to routinely grant broad releases to defendants and sixfigure fees to plaintiffs' counsel in the process. 
a. Misrepresentations in shareholder voting

b. Misrepresentations as to shareholder buying or selling
The evolution of the 14a-9 remedy is more surprising in contrast to the adjacent evolution of the antifraud remedy available under Rule 10b-5. Each provides an antifraud remedy for shareholders--the 14a-9 remedy in connection with shareholder decisions to vote and 10b-5 in connection with decisions to buy or sell. Voting and selling are two of the three core rights provides to shareholders under state law (suing being the third). 63 Logic might suggest some general alignment across the two functions.
Yet as shareholder voting suits have prospered in state law, making use of prior federal developments just discussed, the opposite has happened as to shareholder buying and selling. Shareholder class actions in federal law under Rule 10b-5 continue at a steady pace, even after the PSLRA in 1995 imposed more stringent restrictions of several of the elements required for plaintiff to recover and defendants continue to vigorously litigate each of the elements required for recovery. 64 In contrast, Delaware precedent has made it very difficult to proceed with a class action under state law in a buying and selling situation. 65 These cases are difficult to explain by reference to traditional federalism focused on blanket categories that are either state or federal. A shareholder .or a group of them could run their own candidate, but success there requires a shareholder to incur the expense of seeking proxies sufficient to get more votes than the management candidate, an expense that individual shareholders and even activists find daunting. As a more economical alternative that still provides a strong communicative message to management, shareholders have sometimes pursued "majority voting" bylaws that requires a candidate who gets a plurality but less than majority to resign and may provide that board must look elsewhere for a replacement candidate (or alternatively under some bylaws to permits the board to decline the resignation or reappoint the director.) 67 Governance is a process that flows back and forth between state rules and federal rules and intentionally so. Federalism needs to adapt to such modern illustrations.
c. Changing the method for director voting
d. Shareholder say on executive compensation
The recently enacted federal requirement that shareholders vote on executive compensation has a similar effect. mean one third of the board is elected at each annual meeting so that at least two successive successful proxy campaigns must be run to get control of the board against the wishes of the incumbents. Few insurgents have been willing to tie up their capital for such a period. The state law rules that require boards to approve of any change to the articles before those changes are put to a shareholder vote effectively gave the board a blocking position against efforts to remove the staggered board provision. Even if shareholders succeeded in a getting a majority of votes on a 14a-8 proposal seeking the end of staggered boards, the board could decline to take action, as discussed above. Only when enough institutional shareholders were willing to vote against non-agreeing directors at the next election for directors (or made an effective threat to do so) were boards willing to take the step to agree to changes in the articles. In the space of a few years staggered boards have practically disappeared from the largest American public corporations. 
f. Voting by institutional shareholders
Federal regulators, initially the Department of Labor overseeing fiduciaries of retirement funds held for the benefit of workers, required those fiduciaries to vote those shares held in various plans, something that plan managers had not often done given that economic incentives seldom made voting worthwhile. 71 The result was to grow the business of proxy advisory firms in helping funds meet such requirements and in turn to introduce a new player in corporate governance. This shared governance authority among state law corporate rules, various and often isolated federal rules, and the private ordering preferences of institutional investors, most of whom are agents for retirement plans, has dramatically changed corporate governance in the twenty-first century. In the examples just described, the corporate governance moved away from the default rule of traditional corporate law, but it was not a change in state statutory or common law that directly produced the result. Nor was it the explicit displacement of state law by federal law. It certainly did not reflect any race between different states. Most often, it was a (somewhat small) change in federal rules led to a blurring of the "exclusive" regions for the federal government and the states so that "overlapping state and federal regulation has become the norm for many, if not most" areas of regulation. 72 Thereafter, dual federalism was dead, but as Robert Schapiro observed, "its spirit continues to haunt contemporary discussions of federalism…the dualist conception of federalism as a line-drawing exercise persists." 73 The Court of Appeals' focus in the two Business Roundtable cases discussed in section
IIA above suggests such a line-drawing focus. In contrast, the American discussion of federalism in recent decades has "has moved to a more dynamic or cooperative federalism approach in many areas that were formerly within the exclusive realm of the states, such as health, safety, and environmental protections." 74 And, it might be said for our purposes, corporations. Various adjectives have been added to federalism to make this point and different authors have sometimes suggested different meanings for the same adjective. Cooperative federalism, for example, could mean the federal government establishing national standards or permitting requirements and then delegating to the states to administer the regulation including whether to grant or deny permits. 75 But it often means more of a shared role. Alexandra Klass and Elizabeth Wilson argue that such concurrent regulation results "in a regulatory regime superior to what could be achieved by independent activity of each one" citing benefits form "plurality, dialogue, positive redundancy, greater regulatory competition, policy innovation and resistance to monopolies and group capture." 76 For some, this approach to federalism pushes differences of opinion to be resolved in the political branches-for state governments for example to protect themselves in Congress, leaving courts to a more passive role. 77 The
Business Roundtable decisions discussed above might well fall short under this approach.
What has sometimes been called Process Federalism emphasizes similar values, pushing as many decisions as possible into the Congressional sphere where states ae represented and using "clear statement rules" to incentivize more specific congressional findings and debate. 78 State interests are better "protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal system than by judicially created limitations of federal power."
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The recent examples in corporate law discussed above illustrate the rich and more nuanced interaction that results when there are multiple points of entry for different parties in interest seeking to resolve disputes in a collective enterprise. Even with a more passive judicial role, the process of Congress and the state governments setting forth rules would benefit from a more explicit discussion of which level of government is better suited to determine particular rights and rules. Many such discussions derive from a rational choice model, looking to methods of maximizing social welfare, aggregating preferences, and responding to market failures in private ordering. traditional rationales used to justify federal regulation of externalities and proceeds on the assumption that federal regulation is appropriate when one or more of these rationales applies.
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• regulation at the lowest element of government that geographically encompasses the costs and benefits of the regulated activities, a rationale that would justify federal regulation for pollution that spills over state boundaries;
• a focus on the capacity or willingness of state governments to regulate, for example, as in a race to the bottom context that has long been discussed in corporate law that if true would make reliance on state law questionable or if the jurisdiction is vulnerable to regulatory capture, which may be more likely in a smaller, concentrated jurisdiction than for the country as a whole;
• a need for uniform standards, one justification given for the preemption of state securities registration requirements where issuers seeking to raise money across multiple jurisdictions complained of the expense of having to comply with 50 sets of state rules as well as the federal standards;
• if there is an important national interest in developing an asset or industry, for example when nuclear energy was first used and regulation was assigned to the national government.
The In reality the choices are much more confined. Given the history already discussed the starting point creates path dependencies. Delaware and the other states start from a place that reflects a strongly deregulatory approach and at the same time a preference for centralized control. The federal government, when it intervenes, almost always does so via regulation and limiting centralized control. Given the constitutionally provided dominance of federal power, if used, in most contexts, including corporate law, 84 Bebchuk & Hamdani discuss this as … Delaware can't go so far in preferring management that would wake the bear of federal action that would narrow the space within which state corporate law would be the governing rule.
While states desiring to take business from Delaware could theoretically change their laws to be more regulatory and limiting director power or to move in the opposite direction, the reality is asymmetrical. It is true that North Dakota's 2007 revisions of its corporations statute adopted an intentionally shareholder friendly-approach, but the state's effort have hardly been noticed by corporations thinking about reincorporation.
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Any state that wanted to increase the power of shareholders would be competing against an already large federal footprint that the state change would not likely move the needle of governance enough to attract the desired attention (and revenue) from corporations.
In contrast, Delaware has faced a considerably greater challenge from states desiring to make their corporations statues even more pro-management than Delaware. 
